|Maale Akrabim Massacre|
The bus after the incident
|Location||Scorpions Pass, south of Makhtesh Katan|
|Date||16/17 March 1954 (IST, UTC +2)|
|Suspected perpetrator(s)||By Jordan Bedouin from Gaza By Israel Jordanian villagers By UN Bedouin tribesmen from within Israel or Gaza|
The Ma'ale Akrabim massacre was an attack on an Israeli civilian passenger bus, carried out the night of 16-17 March 1954. Eleven passengers were shot dead by the attackers who ambushed and boarded the bus. Four passengers survived, 2 of whom had been injured by the gunmen.
Scorpions Pass (Hebrew: Ma'ale 'Akrabim) is a narrow, winding grade on the old road connecting Eilat and Beersheba, just south of Makhtesh Ramon, and roughly 60 miles south of Beersheba. The pass was on the primary route between Eilat and central Israel in 1954.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli war ended with the signing of several armistice agreements between Israel and her neighboring Arab states, but border clashes began almost immediately after the signing agreements. On the Israeli-Jordanian border lines, infiltrations, unarmed (71%) and armed (29%), were not infrequent from both sides. According to Israeli sources, between June 1949 and the end of 1952, a total of 57 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed by infiltrators from Jordan. The Israeli death toll for the first 9 months of 1953 was 32. Over roughly the same time (November 1950-November 1953), the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJK/IMAC) condemned Israeli military infiltrations and aggressions 44 times. During the same time Jordan claimed that it suffered 629 killed and injured from Israeli incursions and cross-border bombings. Similar attacks originated from across the Egyptian border and the Gaza strip. In total, 1,300 Israelis were killed and wounded by Arab between 1949 and 1956.  In comparison between 2,700 and 5,000 'infiltrators' were killed in the same period, the great majority of whom were unarmed. A group named as the "Black Hand", comprising of predominantly Bedouin from 'Azazme and Tarrabin tribes living within the al-Auja Demilitarised zone, were known to be carrying out 'revenge raids' principally against other Bedouin, informers in the area but also against Israeli tartgets.
On the night of 16 March, a bus operated by the Egged Israel Transport Cooperative Society on an unscheduled journey carrying 14 passengers made its way from Eilat to Tel Aviv. As it was climbing up the steep grade, it was ambushed by gunmen who shot and killed the driver as well as passengers who tried to escape; they then proceeded to board the bus and shoot and pilfer from the remaining passengers. The male driver, eight male passengers and two female passengers were killed. The four survivors were a five-year-old girl, Miri Firstenberg, after one of the soldiers riding the bus defended her with his body, two Israeli soldiers and a woman.
The next day, Israeli trackers assisted by police dogs and accompanied by UN observers followed the attackers' tracks to a point 6 miles west of the Jordanian border, where the tracks were lost.  Relying on informants, Israeli intelligence sources named 3 suspects from the Jordanian village of Safi as the perpetrators and Lt. Colonel Shalev passed the names to Elmo Hutchison. The Jordanians continued in their endeavours to discover the perpetrators of the attack.
Despite public outcry and call for military retaliation against Jordan, Israel's prime minister Moshe Sharett called for restraint and diplomatic measures, as less than six months before the events, Unit 101 had attacked the village of Qibya as part of Israel's retaliation policy, which resulted in the massacre of 69 people and worldwide condemnation.
Israel requested that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HJK/IMAC) denounce Jordan for the crime. Jordan's representative to the HJK/IMAC pointed out the possibility of the atrocity being carried out by Israeli Bedouin, and HJK/IMAC Chairman, Commander Hutchinson abstained as there was no conclusive proof, resulting in no decision. As a result, Israel left the HJK/IMAC.
Hutcheson suggested that the attackers were either Gaza Bedouin or Israeli Bedouin. John Bagott Glubb suggested that the culprits were from Gaza. This theory gained credibility when, in 1956, an ID from the Ma’ale Akrabim incident was found in Gaza. Many believe that Glubb had been right and Israel wrong, and that the Ma’ale ‘Akrabim killers had indeed come from Egyptian-controlled territory rather than Jordan.
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited the Ma'ale Akrabim incident as evidence that Arab terrorist attacks preceded the Israeli occupation of 1967. In 2007, a reconstructed bus was placed in the Eilat City Museum.
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Which Came First- Terrorism or Occupation - Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 S/635/Rev.1
- ↑ Howard Sachar, History of Israel, p. 450. cited at "Fedayeen Raids 1951 -1956". Jewish Agency for Israel. http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html.
- ↑ Israel's Dirty War by Avi Shlaim. London Review of Books (August 8, 1994) The evidence gleaned by Morris from the various sources he consulted, suggests that infiltration into Israel was a direct consequence of the displacement and dispossession of over 700,000 Palestinians in the course of the Palestine War and that the motives behind it were largely economic and social rather than political. Many of the infiltrators were Palestinian refugees whose reasons for crossing the border included looking for relatives, returning to their homes, recovering possessions, tending to their fields, collecting their crops and, occasionally, exacting revenge. Some of the infiltrators were thieves and smugglers; some were involved in the hashish convoys; while others were nomadic Bedouins, more accustomed to grazing rights than to state borders. There were terroristic and politically-motivated raids, such as those organised by the ex-Mufti, Hajj Amin al Husayni, and financed by Saudi Arabia, but they did not amount to very much. In the period 1949-1956 as a whole, 90 per cent or more of all infiltrations, in Morris's estimate, were motivated by economic and social concerns.
- ↑ Hutchison E (1955) Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks At The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955 pp 73-75 "Black Hand" organization was finally made when one of the sheikhs stated that many of the Bedouins who were mistreated by the Israelis had formed groups to carry out acts of revenge. He claimed that these groups had mined roads, raided Israeli villages as well as camps of the Bedouins who were acting as informers for the Israelis, and had stolen herds of cattle from Israeli shepherds.
- ↑ Morris, Benny (1997) Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198292627 p 63
- ↑ Thefts were quite common, mostly among the poorer Bedouin who utilised the opportunity to steal valuable property and machinery used by the Israeli Government in developing the southern part of the country. The shooting of these Bedouin by Israelis incited blood feuds and resulted in vendettas which caused a chain reactions, culminating in additional killings. Many such incidents occurred in the Negev and might be explained as Bedouin actions of blood revenge. The massacre of the bus passengers in Maleh ha-Akrabim (The Scorpion Pass) on the way to Eilat was possibly one of them. Avi Plascov, (1981) The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-1957: 1948-1957 By Published by Routledge, 1981 ISBN 0714631205 p 86
- ↑ Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, p. 309, Benny Morris, Oxford University Press, 1997
- ↑ Hutchison E (1955) Violent Truce: p 53 The shoes had been removed from some of the victims, the ring finger had been cut from another, a handbag was taken, the bus tool box and a suitcase were stolen, the ammunition and weapons of the military guards on the bus were taken, and one of the survivors testified that "one [of the attackers] also went to the roof [of the bus] to steal something
- ↑ Rosalyn Higgins (1981) United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, pp 121-122
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 "Massacre at Scorpion's Pass". Time. 1954-03-29. ISSN 0040-718X. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,819663,00.html. Retrieved 2008-12-13.
- ↑ UN Doc S/3252 of 19 June 1954Report dated 19 June 1954 by the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO in Palestine to the Secretary-General concerning the Scorpion Pass incident On 19 March 1954, a United Nations observer and an Israel officer heard statements from and put questions to the two adult survivors who had escaped unscathed--an Israel army sergeant and a girl. It was also possible to put a few questions to a wounded girl--a private in the Israel army--and to a small child.
- ↑ UN Doc In subsequent days, a joint Israeli-Jordanian posse managed to follow a second set of tracks as far as 2 miles from the border, a connection between the two sets of tracks was never established.The same United Nations observer returned to the Scorpion Pass in the early morning of 18 March 1954, together with the Israel representatives on the Mixed Armistice Commission, who were accompanied by three trackers, three dogs and two dog-masters. At 07.00 h they picked up tracks on the narrow path explored by the United Nations observer on the previous evening. Tracks which seemed to be those of about four to seven persons who had walked towards the east led to Wadi Fuqra and were followed in the bed of the wadi and sometimes, where the walls were not steep, on one of its sides, until 1500 h. At that time, after having been followed for about 17 kilometers, the tracks were lost at approximately MR 1724-0376 (about 9.5 kilometers, in a straight line, in the scene of the incident, and about 11.5 kilometers, a straight line, from the nearest point on the armistice demarcation line between Israel and Jordan). From the spot where the tracks were lost, Wadi Fuqra continues to go down in a north-easterly direction until it opens up, over 5 kilometers from the armistice demarcation line, into the flat land of the Ghor, to the south of the Dead Sea. In addition, about 1.5 kilometers from the spot were the tracks were lost, a path provides another natural exit from the wadi towards the south, and a short distance further on there are numerous other natural exits leading to the north and to the south. The tracks followed on 18 March were those of persons who walked down the wadi. Now and then, in the bed of the wadi, near the water pools and at other places where the ground was soft, there were tracks of persons who had walked in the opposite direction. On 19 March, the senior Israel delegate was informed that tracks had been found by the Israel trackers some 8 kilometers to the south-east of the spot where the tracks had been lost on the previous afternoon. Accompanied by two United Nations observers, he went to approximately MR 1785-0300. Tracks of apparently two persons, one of them barefooted, were followed for a [f]ew hundred meters until nightfall. The connection between those tracks and those followed on the previous day was not established.
- ↑ On Wednesday of last week, the Mixed Armistice Commission was shocked by the news of an attack on an Israel bus near Ma'ale Akrabim [Scorpion Pass]. United Nations military observers were sent immediately to the scene of the incident, and their initial reports were graphic in describing this horrible crime. Since that first day, most of the military observers assigned to the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission have working on this case. These observers, working with members of the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission, Israel police and army officials, dog handlers with highly trained tracking hounds, expert Israel trackers, joined later by experienced Bedouin trackers from Jordan, have worked almost beyond endurance to establish the guilt for this crime. At no time during the years since the conclusion of the armistice agreement has a more intensive investigation been carried out. Even so, the evidence brought out is far from being conclusive. I do regret the Israel delegation's refusal to allow the Mixed Armistice Commission the opportunity completely to investigate Israel's claim of knowledge concerning the actual perpetrators of this crime. The possibility of Jordanians being responsible for this crime still exists; however, persons from outside Jordan could also be guilty of this outrage. True, tracks were found, perhaps connected to this crime, but they were lost approximately 10 kilometers in a straight line from the demarcation line. The empty cartridges found at the scene of the incident do not point conclusively to any one group. The testimony of the witnesses indicates that Arabs were involved; however, the description of the two men who allegedly entered the bus a doubt as to whether they were all Arabs. And the establishment of the fact that Arabs were involved does not in the least connect this crime to the inhabitants of any one country. This Mixed Armistice Commission will always avoid condemning a government on inconclusive evidence. UN Doc
- ↑ Hutchison E (1955) Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks At The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955 p 49
- ↑ Hutchison E (1955) Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks At The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955 p 63 On March 23, immediately following the final meeting concerning the bus incident, Jordan had been asked to continue searching for the three men named by Israel as the leaders of the attacking group. It was also requested at the same time that a thorough check be made on the movements of Bedouin tribes, as well as individual Bedouins, during the period just preceding and following the raid. Officials of all villages from north of Hebron to the Gulf of Aqaba were requested to forward any information obtained that might shed light on the incident. A short time later the MAC was notified that six Arabs from Quseima in the Egyptian Sinai had been arrested for illegal entry into Jordan on the day preceding the bus attack. Although the time of their arrest cleared them from suspicion in that case, they had admitted the killing of an Israeli Arab before entering Jordan. The incident, as described by the prisoners, seemed to match the details of a complaint that had been filed by Israel.
- ↑ The Department of State issued a statement on October 18, 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, October 26, 1953, p. 552).
- ↑ Morris, Benny (1993) Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198292627 pp 309-313 In Israel, there was a hue and cry for retaliation against Jordan. But Sharett, favoured restraint, which helped to repair Israel’s image in the West, opposed a reprisal while the memory of Qibya was still fresh. Uncertainty about the perpetrators identity facilitated restraint....
- ↑ UN Doc S/PV.630 of 27 October 1953
- ↑ UN Doc S/RES/101(1953) S/3139/Rev.2 of 24 November 1953 Israel censured in security council resolution
- ↑ 21.0 21.1 Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956, p. 311, Benny Morris, Oxford University Press, 1997
- ↑ UN Doc S/3252 of 19 June 1954Report dated 19 June 1954 by the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO in Palestine to the Secretary-General concerning the Scorpion Pass incident
- ↑ Morris pp 311-313
- ↑ When Israel occupied the Gaza Strip in 1956, two years later, considerable evidence was found that the Scorpion Pass incident was the work of Arab Bedouins. Political Affairs By Trade Union Educational League (U.S.), Earl Browder, Herbert Aptheker, Communist Party of the United States of America, Gus Hall Published by Political Affairs Pub., 1967 P 15
- ↑ Morris, Benny (1993) Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198292627 pp 309-313 In an internal memorandum, Hutchison wrote the day before the MAC vote that, while the Israeli authorities were busy ‘whipping public sentiment into a white heat’ against Jordan, it was equally possible that the murders had been carried out by vengeful ‘Israeli Bedouin’ or Bedouin from Israeli-Egyptian DMZ. The US embassy in Tel Aviv felt Hutchison’s abstention had been ‘reasonable’... The Jordanians proved unable to trace the three named suspects by Israel. From the first, Glubb had been convinced that Jordanians were not involved. Rather he looked to Egypt for those responsible: ‘We have information regular armed parties from Sinai and Gaza Strip are committing terrorist acts in Israel. Some of these deliberately escape into Jordan after[wards]...Seems probable... incidents may be organised by [ex-] mufti from Egypt. E. L. M. Burns, agreed with the assumption that the murders had been committed by Egyptians or persons under Egyptian jurisdiction. But there was no definite proof, he added. Possible proof of Egyptian responsibility surfaced during Israel’s brief occupation of Gaza Strip following the Sinai-Suez War. According to an article in the Jerusalem Post of 7 December 1956, the identity cards of the Ma’ale ‘Akrabim killers had indeed come from Egyptian-controlled territory rather than Jordan...
- ↑ Ohayoun, Meir (2007-01-22). "The blood bus returned to Scorpions Pass". Ynet. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3355452,00.html. Retrieved 2008-12-08. (Hebrew)
- Morris, Benny (1997) Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198292627
- Hutchison E (1955) Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks At The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955
- Political Affairs By Trade Union Educational League (U.S.), Earl Browder, Herbert Aptheker, Communist Party of the United States of America, Gus Hall Published by Political Affairs Pub., 1967
- Avi Plascov, (1981) The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948-1957: 1948-1957 By Published by Routledge, 1981 ISBN 0714631205